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## ABSTRACTS

Luca Gili, *Interpreting Aristotle's Modal Logic* (pp. 1-12)

This paper discusses some recent interpretations of Aristotle's modal syllogistic. The paper contains a defense of the use of formal representations and a criticism of scholars who reject this tool when they aim at making sense of Aristotle's logic. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle's modal logic relies on the theory of predication expounded in the *Topics*. Consequently, modal syllogistic may serve the purpose of being the underlying logic of all sciences.

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Pavel Gregoric, Christian Pfeiffer, *Grasping Aristotle's Intellect* (pp. 13-32)

In this paper we offer a novel interpretation of the second *aporia* stated in Aristotle's *De Anima*, III, 4, the question whether the intellect can think itself. We propose that the *aporia* does not aim at reflexive awareness of one's own thoughts, as is commonly assumed, but relies on a more objectivist account of the intellect. The question, we claim, is whether the intellect can itself become an object of intellectual grasp. On our interpretation of III, 4, Aristotle argues that the intellect is itself thinkable insofar as it thinks its objects, which means that grasping the intellect is a matter of grasping the objects that it thinks. We show that, on this account, there is no difference in the way one grasps one's own intellect and the way one grasps another person's intellect.

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Laura M. Castelli, *Alexander on Aristotle, An. Pr., I, 31, Division and Syllogistic* (pp. 33-54)

*An. Pr.*, I, 31 is one of the several passages Aristotle devotes to the method of division. From other texts we know that he is not unwilling to make room for a constructive use of division within the search for and the formulation of definitions. However, in *An. Pr.*, I, 31 the basic issue seems to be whether division understood as a procedure typically embedded in a standardized argumentative practice can be regarded as a part of a general deductive method. Although the results of Aristotle's discussion in this chapter are mainly negative, I shall argue that Alexander takes seriously the idea that division might actually play some role in the formulation of some deductive arguments. In spelling out this proposal, Alexander relies on a theory of deductive arguments much richer than Aristotle's syllogistic in the *Analytics* and provides a systematic theoretical framework to interpret Aristotle's claim that division is only a 'small part' of syllogistic.

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Damian Caluori, *Divine Practical Thought in Plotinus* (pp. 55-78)

Plotinus follows the *Timaeus* and the Platonist tradition before him in postulating the existence of a World Soul whose function it is to care for the sensible world as a whole. It is argued that, since the sensible world is providentially arranged, the World Soul's care presupposes a sort of practical thinking that is as timeless as intellectual contemplation. To explain why this thinking is *practical*, the paper discusses Plotinus' view on Aristotle's distinction between *praxis* and *poiêsis*. To explain why it is *timeless*, it studies Plotinus' view on Aristotle's distinction between complete and incomplete actuality. The focus is on *Enn.* IV 4, 9-12.

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Angela Longo, *Paradeigma and the Noetic Cause in Plotinus' Works, with Particular Reference to Treatise 31 'On the Intelligible Beauty' (Enn. V 8, ch. 7)* (pp. 79-102)

The paper offers a survey of the use of the term *paradeigma* in Plotinus' *Enneads*. There are 34 occurrences of that word in Plotinian works; most

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of them (23) are concentrated in the treatises of the second group (n. 22-45), written by Plotinus in Rome between 263 and 268 A.D. The word *paradeigma* is used by Plotinus according to the three ordinary meanings the term has in Ancient Greek, namely 'example', 'exemplary instance' and 'model'. In the cases where *paradeigma* means 'model' the platonic dialogue *Timaeus* is often quoted or paraphrased. But in some cases (as we propose, in treatises 31, 33, 39 and 47) *paradeigma* means a model which does not have only a formal causal power (something which a demiurge look at in order to produce something else), but also a productive causal power, and in fact it is the intelligible world that produces the sensible one (this also depends on how one reads the Greek in *Enn.* V 8, ch. 7, 24). This special Plotinian use is, at least in our view, in accordance with a non-literal reading, given by the philosopher, of Plato's demiurge in the *Timaeus*. In concentrating in the intelligible model every type of causality (formal as well as productive and, also, final) Plotinus does not need any more a demiurge and he can successfully reply to the criticisms that Epicureans addressed against the too human demiurge of Plato's *Timaeus* as well as to the idea that all things are by chance and that there is no providence. He can also, and above all, reply to the Gnostics who introduced the novelty of a 'new earth', despising this world and its producer as ugly and bad. On the contrary, against both adversaries, Plotinus presents an intelligible model at the top of its power and beauty, and in such a way that it is 'responsible' for this sensible world, especially for its being ordered and beautiful.

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Fedor Benevich, *The 'Divine Existence': On the Ontological Status of the Essence qua Essence in Avicenna* (pp. 103-128)

According to Avicenna, essences in themselves possess neither particularity (existence in extramental reality) nor universality (existence in the mind) but rather a 'divine existence' (*al-wugud al-ilahi*). This paper considers previous interpretations of this famous phrase, first taking up the idea that divine existence might be existence in the mind of the Active Intellect, and then the proposal that it is to be identified with '*al-wugud al-hass*', i.e. the essence. Both interpretations are shown to be unsatisfactory. Instead, the paper argues, divine existence is the existence of the essence *qua* essence, which enters into a compound individual or universal. On the basis of Avicenna's logical treatises, it is shown that the dis-

inction between divine existence and other forms of existence is a merely epistemic one, rather than being an ontological distinction. Finally, it is shown how this interpretation fits with Avicenna's account of God's causality: God creates individuals while rendering essences *qua* essences existent.

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Silvia Di Vincenzo, *Avicenna against Porphyry's Definition of Differentia Specifica* (pp. 129-184)

The paper deals with Avicenna's polemical attitude towards the traditional definition of *differentia specifica* as *predicated of many items differing in species in the 'what sort of thing is it ?'* that can be found in Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Two places of the reworking of Porphyry's *Isagoge* (*Madhal*) at the beginning of Avicenna's *summa* entitled *Kitab al-Šifa'* will be mainly considered: the original account of *differentia* in chap. I, 13 ; and the rejection of Porphyry's distinction between genus and *differentia* in chap. II, 1. By comparing these passages of *Madhal* to other sections of the *Šifa'*, it will be possible to reconstruct in a comprehensive way Avicenna's refutation of the traditional account of *differentia*, in order to explain his preference for alternative definitions of this predicable in his other logical works. The exegetical problems posed by Porphyry's definition of *differentia*, and the Greek and Arabic commentators' ensuing discussions, provide the context in which Avicenna elaborates his refutation. Against this background, it will be argued that Avicenna is carrying out a refutation of the account of *differentia* first advanced by Porphyry and later adopted by the contemporary Peripatetic commentators active in Baghdad, in his effort to achieve a consistent interpretation of Aristotle's claims on *differentia*.

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Fabrizio Amerini, *Remoto rationali, remanet vivum. Thomas Aquinas, the Liber de causis and the End of Human Life* (pp. 185-210)

The present article discusses a text from Thomas Aquinas's *Commentary on Liber de causis* that seems to give evidence to the distinc-

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tion between end of human life and biological death of the living organism in Thomas. This text establishes a parallelism between substantial generation and corruption, so introducing an apparent exception to the 'functionalism' that inspires the whole anthropological teaching of Thomas. After discussing different interpretations, our conclusion is that it is possible to reconcile the causal and essentially neo-Platonic doctrine behind this text with the functionalist principle, Aristotelian in essence, of the homonymy between what is alive and what is dead. For Thomas, the end of human life coincides with the biological death of the living organism. The removal of forms in the process of substantial corruption begins after and not before the detachment of the soul from the body.

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Marta Borgo, *Between Avicenna and Averroes: Considerations on the Early Aquinas' Aristotle* (pp. 211-240)

This article provides a bottom-up case study of the early Aquinas' reading of Aristotle's *libri naturales* under the guidance of the Latin Avicenna and Averroes. It allows settling more precisely the intricate question of Avicenna's and Averroes' doctrinal and exegetical influence on the first works by Aquinas, and concludes that his Aristotelianism must be situated mid-way between the two. From a systematic analysis of several quotations from Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes in Aquinas' *Scriptum* on book II of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, it emerges that such references are largely interconnected. In his reading of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, Aquinas is heavily influenced by both Avicenna and Averroes, but at different levels. While he sees the Commentator as the most faithful reader of Aristotle, Avicenna's philosophical elaboration seems to him the most appropriate one.

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Gabriele Galluzzo, *Aquinas on Parts, Wholes, and Aristotelian Anti-Reductionism* (pp. 241-276)

The paper discusses Aquinas's Aristotelian claim that substances are not aggregates of either their ordinary parts or their metaphysical constituents.

The analysis is conducted through a survey of Aquinas's mereological theory against the background of standard contemporary mereology. It is argued in particular that Aquinas rejects three fundamental principles of standard mereology, i.e. *Monism*, *Extensionalism* and *Universalism*. The paper focuses in particular on Aquinas's rejection of *Monism* and endorsement of *Pluralism*, and argues that Aquinas distinguishes three fundamental kinds of whole: mixtures, relational wholes and hylomorphic composites (substances). The distinguishing features of hylomorphic composites with respect to the other kinds of whole are illustrated by considering Aquinas's thoughts about actuality, potentiality and existence.

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Silvia Donati, *Between Psychology and Philosophy of Nature: The Doctrine of the Species in the Discussion on Natural Causality (English Commentaries on the Libri naturales ca. 1240-1300)* (pp. 277-336)

In his treatise *De lineis, angulis et figuris seu de fractionibus et reflexionibus radiorum* Robert Grosseteste gives an explanation of natural causation based on the theory of multiplication of species. According to Grosseteste, every physical object emanates *species*, that is likenesses or power by which the object acts on its surroundings. The effect of this power on the recipient varies with the nature of the recipient. Thus, in Grosseteste's theory, the notion of *species*, which is normally used within a psychological context for the explanation of sense perception as well as intellectual knowledge, becomes the basis for a general explanation of natural causality. In Grosseteste's account, the analysis of the propagation of visible light serves as a model for the study of the more general phenomenon of the multiplication of species. Since he believes that not only the propagation of light, but, more generally, the multiplication of species proceeds according to geometrical rules, Grosseteste in the *De lineis* describes geometry as the basis of all natural explanations. The purpose of this paper is to give an assessment of the influence of Grosseteste's theory of multiplication of species on the 13th century English Aristotelian tradition. My analysis is based on an extensive investigation of 13th century unpublished commentaries on Aristotle's *libri naturales* and is especially focused on commentaries on the *De generatione et corruptione* and the *Physics*. The general conclusion that emerges from my investigation is that in the early phases of the commentary tradition, in the years ca. 1240-1270, Grosseteste's theory is very influential, whereas its influence seems to disappear in the last decades of the century. The early commentators were very much interested

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in the physical aspects of Grosseteste's theory, whereas we do not notice a similar attention for its mathematical implications.

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Giorgio Pini, *Scotus on Objective Being* (pp. 337-368)

Scotus's views on objective being — i.e. the special way objects of thought are supposed to be in the mind — have been recently interpreted in different ways. In this paper, I argue that Scotus's apparently contradictory statements on objective being can be made sense only if they are read against the background of his theory of essence. Specifically, I claim that a key point of Scotus's position is that objects of thoughts are in the mind but have mind-independent identity (they are *in* the mind but not *of* the mind). I defend my interpretation by focusing on a usually neglected passage from Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics* where Scotus provides an unusually explicit (if short) account of what he takes 'to be objectively in the intellect' to mean.

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Gian Pietro Soliani, *Duns Scotus on the First Object of the Human Intellect. From the ens univocum to the ens possibile* (pp. 369-398)

This article reconsiders the evolution of Scotus's position about the first and most adequate object of the human intellect in some of Scotus's works. I also try to demonstrate that only Scotus's last solution to the problem of the first and most adequate object of human intellect is coherent with his epistemology. This solution represents a point of departure from Avicenna's thought and shows the decreasing importance of the univocity of being in the characterization of the first and most adequate object of the human intellect. Finally, I point out that being as the first and adequate object of the human intellect is not a product of a psychological abstraction, but it is present originally in the human memory and intellect as the condition of possibility for human knowledge and science.

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Riccardo Fedriga, Roberto Limonta, *Prophetae non dixerunt falsum. Perceptual Space and Semantical Space in Peter Auriol's and William of Ockham's Theories on Prophecy* (pp. 399-432)

In this article we intend to explore the use of the prophetic statements in some epistemic models of XIVth-century theology. Specifically, we shall focus on Peter Auriol's and William of Ockham's theories: although they lead to different solutions, these theories are grounded on a common linguistic approach to the topic. For XIVth-century theologians, the prophecy becomes a kind of epistemic test, useful to verify coherence and firmness of the theories of knowledge. Peter Auriol manages to reconcile divine foreknowledge, future contingents and human free will with a distinction of epistemological levels. In the case of prophecies, God apprehends things and facts in the modes that are proper to his own knowledge, i.e. necessarily determined as true or false. This ensures a ground to the logic and ontological order of creation. In the same way, human knowledge apprehends in her own mode, i.e. with all the contingency of the events collocated in space and time, so securing the openness of the future and the freedom of the human will. For Ockham instead, in the wake of Duns Scotus's definition of theology as practical science, prophetic statements have a pragmatic and semiotic nature. They are not principally descriptions or predictions of facts, but regulative signs: prophetic statements must so be intended as speech acts with a performative nature, that indicate to the *viator* how to rightly act and connect linguistic terms and factual events according to the simplicity of the order created by God.

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Han Thomas Adriaenssen, *The Representation of Hercules. Ockham's Critique of Species* (pp. 433-456)

In the second book of his *Reportatio*, Ockham extensively criticizes the theory of species, which he takes to say that we access reality by apprehending inner representations of external objects. This theory, Ockham found, was unnecessarily complicated, and his own philosophical psychology accordingly proceeds without species. According to some commentators, Ockham furthermore objected to the species theory on the ground that, from behind a veil of species, we would never be able to com-

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pare our representations with their external objects to ascertain their reliability. In this paper, however, I argue that such readings sit uneasily with the broader context of Ockham's epistemology. The argument in Ockham most often cited in support of such readings, I argue, has often been misunderstood. In this paper, I offer a new reconstruction of that argument, and point out how it compares to an apparently similar objection to the species theory discussed by John Peckham.

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Mario Bertagna, *Topical Maxims, Formal Consequences, and Schemata* (pp. 457-494)

According to Abelard a topical maxim is a (valid) proposition schema, i.e. a complex system consisting of a template — a syntactic string composed of words and/or symbols and placeholders such as letters — and a side condition which specifies how placeholders are to be filled to obtain (true) instances. On Abelard's view, the logical form of a consequence is displayed by the proposition schema whose side condition imposes no constraint on the substituends for the placeholders occurring in the schema-template (§2). This view on the logical form of consequences is challenged by Giles of Rome, who seems to endorse the thesis that the logical form of a consequence is displayed not by a template, but by a proposition schema as a whole (§3). In §4 I argue that the identification of the logical structure of a consequence with a proposition schema can account for the view, upheld by some XIVth century authors, that consequences from an inferior term to one of its superiors or the other way round must be classified as formally valid consequences on a par with logically valid consequences. Finally, in §5 some suggestions are made as to the rationale behind the thesis that the logical form of a consequence is displayed by a proposition schema.

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Michael Engel, *Elijha Del Medigo and Agostino Nifo on Intellegible Species* (pp. 495-520)

The article contains a comparative analysis of Agostino Nifo's and Elijah Del Medigo's discussion of intelligible species. More specifically, the

article examines their view concerning the presence of intelleible species in the psychological works of Averroes, a popular field of discussion among Renaissance Aristotelians. Whereas the two authors differ in their final conclusion, their general analysis of Averroes bears a striking resemblance, which, in turn, enables one to rethink and recontextuaize Del Medigo's general role in the context of Paduan intellectual history. As the comparison with Nifo clearly shows, Del Medigo was not merely a translator working at the service of his Christian Patrons, but also an independent thinker who formulated original arguments, an early example of what came to be the Paduan Averroist school.

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